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Abstract—I examine how foreign presence affects the growth and survival of
domestic firms. Separating a negative crowding out and positive technology
spillovers, I analyze whether the crowding out effect is dynamic, that is,
domestic firms cut production over time as foreign firms grow, or a static
effect realized on foreign entry into the industry. Using 1994–2001 firm-
level Czech data, I find evidence of both technology spillovers and crowding
out. However, crowding out is only short term; after initial entry shakeout,
growing foreign sales increase domestic firm growth and survival, indicating
domestic demand creation effect. However, I find no such benefits from
domestic competition.
I. Introduction
WITH increasing globalization, opening up of economies,and deregulation of markets, the role of FDI in the
world economy has increased rapidly. MNCs became key
drivers of the world GDP, and the total FDI stock raised from
8% to 26% of world GDP between 1990 and 2006 (OECD,
2008). Since the mid-1990s, FDI has become the main source
of external finance for developing countries and is more than
twice as large as official development aid. FDI has been play-
ing an important role as well in the transitional countries
of central and eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic,
where domestic mass privatization failed in the restructuring
process of the formerly state-owned enterprises (Kocˇenda &
Svejnar, 2003). The expansion of FDI, as a major source of
financial capital and new technologies especially in emerging
markets, raised expectations about its potential contributions
to the economic growth and development. Hence, many coun-
tries not only liberalized their markets, but started to offer
generous investment packages, such as tax holidays, import
duty exemptions, or preferential loans (UNCTAD, 2003) to
attract FDI. However, the evidence of the impact of FDI on
host economies is mixed. This issue is important not only to
academics and policymakers, but also to managers of MNCs,
because it a affects their reputation and bargaining position
in the host countries (Meyer, 2004).
Theory on technology diffusion advocates that FDI will
promote growth as MNCs confer technology spillovers to
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domestic firms.1 This view, supported by early case stud-
ies and industry-level findings (Caves, 1974; Blomström,
1986), emphasizes that activities of MNCs should generate
knowledge externalities, that is, facilitate the transfer of more
efficient technology and management practices from for-
eign to domestic firms. Macroeconomic studies (Borensztein,
Gregorio & Lee 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004) provide support-
ing evidence, but only under some conditions, and Carkovic
and Levine (2005) find no evidence of a positive impact of
FDI on economic growth. Firm-level panel studies, for exam-
ple, Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison
(1999), have found negative or no spillover effects. Studies
in transitional economies show similar results: negative FDI
spillovers were found in the Czech Republic (Djankov and
Hoekman, 2000; Kinoshita, 2000; Sabirianova et al., 2005),
Bulgaria, and Romania, but no spillovers were found in
Poland (Konings, 2001). Using data for seventeen emerging
markets, Gorodnichenko Svejnar, and Terrell (2007) suggest
that the presence of spillovers may depend on various firm,
industry, and institutional characteristics.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) explain these contradictory
findings as “market stealing” or the crowding-out effect. They
argue that even though technology spillovers exist, more effi-
cient foreign firms may draw demand from domestic firms, so
the negative competitive effect may outweigh positive tech-
nology spillovers. Caves (1996) and Blomström, Kokko, and
Zejen (2000) also argue that the likelihood that MNCs will
crowd out local firms is larger in developing than in developed
countries because of a higher technology gap between domes-
tic and foreign firms.2 From a policy perspective, these results
and arguments raise concern as to whether FDI incentives are
justified, especially in developing or transitional countries.
Another concern is that the fear of being crowded out and a
popular belief that MNCs will monopolize domestic markets
complicates the restructuralization process in many transi-
tional countries.3 Indeed, the protectionist backlash against
FDI has recently arisen not only in emerging markets, such
as Russia and Latin America, but in developed countries,
including the United States and Europe (Economist, 2008;
UNCTAD, 2006). However, if crowding out is just a short-
run effect and positive spillovers dominate in the long run, as
suggested by Aitken and Harrison, these actions may impede
growth in many transitional and developing countries.
1 See Findlay (1978) and the survey by Keller (2004). Technology in
this context includes products, production process, distribution networks,
management, and marketing, for example.
2 Dawar and Frost (1999) discuss that in emerging markets, FDI often
represents a “death sentence” for local firms because they usually cannot
compete with MNCs that possess technological and financial advantages.
3 Cordonnier (2002) discusses this issue during the restructuring of the
banking industry in Russia.
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Table 1.—Net FDI Inflows in CEECs, 1989–2004 (millions of USD)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Czech Republic 257 132 513 983 563 749 2,526 1,276
Croatia 0 0 0 13 102 110 109 486
Hungary 0 311 1,459 1,471 2,328 1,097 4,410 2,279
Poland 11 0 117 284 580 542 1,134 2,741
Slovak Republic 0 24 82 100 107 236 194 199
Slovenia NA −2 −41 113 111 129 161 167
Estonia NA NA NA 80 156 212 199 111
Latvia NA NA NA 29 50 279 245 379
Lithuania NA NA NA 8 30 31 72 152
Bulgaria 0 4 56 41 40 105 98 138
Romania 0 −18 37 73 87 341 417 415
EU 42,282 58,480 48,053 54,595 49,034 47,082 68,814 70,696
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Cumulative: 1989–2004
Czech Republic 1,275 3,591 6,234 4,943 4,820 8,226 40,831
Croatia 347 835 1,445 1,086 1,424 1,000 7,630
Hungary 1,741 1,555 1,720 1,123 2,255 598 23,635
Poland 3,041 4,966 6,348 8,171 6,928 3,700 44,552
Slovak Republic 84 374 701 2,058 1,460 4,007 11,626
Slovenia 303 221 59 71 371 1,790 3,683
Estonia 130 574 222 324 343 185 2,736
Latvia 515 303 331 400 151 388 3,420
Lithuania 328 921 478 375 439 714 4,098
Bulgaria 507 537 789 1,003 641 430 5,289
Romania 1,267 2,079 1,025 1,051 1,154 1,080 10,108
EU 75,204 145,563 206,428 401,868 NA NA 1,225,816
Source: William Davidson Institute data tables.
To provide new evidence on these issues, I use data for
a transitional country, the Czech Republic, and ask the fol-
lowing questions: Is there evidence of a crowding-out effect
in a transitional country? Are there technology spillovers?
What is the mechanism of crowding out? - Is it a dynamic
effect, where domestic firms continue to cut production over
time as foreign firms grow in the domestic industry, or is it
a short-term static effect realized on foreign entry into the
industry? In the end, is the impact of foreign competition
really different from that of domestic competition?
While previous firm-level studies analyzed the impact of
FDI on domestic firm productivity, I address these questions
by analyzing the impact of foreign presence on the growth
and survival of domestic firms. Firm growth and exit are the
underpinnings of job creation and destruction. Knowing how
FDI affects these variables will help us not only better assess
the impact of FDI on domestic firm performance but better
understand the impact on the entire economy.
I use theoretical and empirical methodology that over-
comes several shortcomings in the literature. First, I separate
the crowding out from the technology spillover effect. Previ-
ous studies usually used only one measure for FDI presence
and as such can provide only the short-run net FDI impact,
that is, whether the positive technology transfer outweighs
the negative competitive effect within the same time period.
However, if the estimated effect is zero, as it is in several
studies, we do not know whether spillover and competitive
effects exist at all or whether they are just perfectly balanced.
Moreover, if these effects have different timing, mixing them
into one measure may bias the overall picture. From a theoret-
ical and a policy perspective, it is important to separate these
effects to better understand how domestic firms adjust to FDI
and how institutions or market forces could affect the size of
each effect. Second, I incorporate firm exit into the analyses.
Most research on FDI spillovers has neglected the possibility
that domestic firms may exit as a result of foreign competi-
tion. Then the positive evidence on FDI spillovers might be
overestimated. Interestingly, the impact of FDI on domestic
firm survival has not received much attention in the litera-
ture. Görg and Strobl (2000) and De Backer and Sleuwaegen
(2003) are to my knowledge the only studies that analyze the
impact of FDI on domestic firm survival, but they do so for
developed countries. Third, my framework allows analyzing
the FDI impact on firm performance without input measure-
ment. So one can avoid the input endogeneity problems in
productivity estimations.4
Theoretically, I rely on a model that combines a dominant
firm and competitive fringe framework with a Jovanovic-type
model of firm and industry dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982; Sun,
2002). The model gives predictions for the growth and exit of
domestic firms, which I test using a unique 1994–2001 panel
data set on foreign and domestic firms in the Czech Republic.
I focus on this country for several reasons. First, a single coun-
try helps to avoid the empirical difficulties with controlling
for cross-country differences that affect FDI inflows. Second,
as table 1 shows, the Czech Republic is one of the countries
with the highest FDI inflows in central and eastern Europe,
so there should be a sufficient foreign presence to address my
4 Though several studies (e.g., Blalock, 2002; Javorcik, 2004) used the
Olley-Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method to correct for the
endogeneity of inputs, Haskel et al. (2007) discuss that the assumptions of
these methods might be unsuitable for analyses of FDI spillovers.
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questions. Third, unlike other transitional countries with high
FDI inflows, such as Hungary or Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic was virtually closed until transition started in 1989, so
it provides almost a natural experiment environment for my
study. Finally, being a model for countries that started transi-
tion later, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet
Union, the results might be generalizable to other countries.
Compared to many other studies, my data provide an exten-
sive coverage of firms of different sizes, including small firms
and single entrepreneurs, whose presence is important to fully
capture the FDI impact. Moreover, firm-level data for eight
years of transition, almost double time the period of most
previous studies, allow me to control for all kinds of fixed
effects as well as firm self-selection and thus avoid potential
endogeneity problems with FDI inflows.
My results show evidence of both technology spillover
and crowding-out effects. However, crowding out appears to
be a short-term or static phenomenon. Initial foreign entry
increases the exit rate of domestic firms; subsequently, how-
ever, the sales growth of the foreign firms in the industry
increases both the growth rate and the survival of domes-
tic firms. Dividing industries between low- and high-export
oriented suggests that this positive foreign growth effect rep-
resents domestic demand creation, not export spillovers. My
estimates also suggest that the positive externalities due to
demand creation and technology spillovers offset the static
crowding-out effect within two years. These results are robust
across different specifications. Including measures for the
entry and growth of other domestic firms, together with sub-
sample analyses according to the level of FDI presence,
further confirms my findings and provides compelling evi-
dence that the impact of foreign firms is indeed different from
that of domestic firms. Although, while there are long-run
benefits from foreign competition, there are no such benefits
from other domestic firms. Further analyses also show that
domestic firms in the technologically advanced industries are
the primary beneficiaries of technology spillovers.
My paper brings several contributions to the literature.
First, it extends the literature on FDI, economic growth, and
development. Second, it links FDI literature with studies on
firm and industry dynamics. Only recently have these stud-
ies started to consider the impact of trade liberalization on
firm sizes and industry evolution.5 My results show that FDI
liberalization can also initiate industry shakeout and affect
domestic firm sizes. Third, it relates to the literature on prod-
uct market regulation. Schiantarelli (2005) points out that
“there is little evidence on the effect of regulatory changes
on firm outcomes in developing countries.” My paper shows
how removing FDI entry barriers in a small, closed economy
affects domestic firm performance. It also indicates that reg-
ulation should not discriminate against MNCs since foreign
competition in emerging markets can generate much larger
long-run benefits than domestic competition can.
5 See, for example, Nocke and Yeaple (2006) and Ederington and
McCalman (2005).
As on anecdotal example, I discuss the case of the Czech
auto industry, one of the most successful industries in
attracting FDI. By 2000 one-third of the top 100 European
auto parts firms operated in the industry, with a total for-
eign market share of 81%.6 In 2005 cars represented 20%
of the Czech industrial output and employed more than
130,000 people. As BusinessWeek noted, “The auto-driven
boom is also changing the landscape. Roads are being paved
and widened, new hyperstores are being built and facto-
ries are mushrooming” (“Detroit East,” 2005). This boom
started in 1991 when German Volkswagen privatized a major
state-owned car company, Škoda. The success of new Škoda
cars, the central location of the Czech Republic, with an
easy access to all European markets, cheap and high-skilled
labor, and generous FDI incentives attracted other MNCs,
mostly into the auto parts segments; among them are Ford
(car lighting systems), Robert Bosch (diesel engine com-
ponents), Daewoo (engines), and Hayes Lemmerz (wheel
assembly). In 2005 another big car company, a Toyota-PSA
Peugeot Citroën, joint plant, entered the industry. Today the
Czech Republic is called the “Hub of Detroit East.”7 For-
eign production also boosted domestic auto parts producers
that had suffered huge output declines in the early 1990s
due to market liberalization. In particular, Škoda’s training
program helped many of them, including Gumotex (rub-
ber parts and seat upholstery), Karsit (seat parts), and Brisk
Tábor (spark plugs), to increase quality and expand sales
to other car producers.8 However, not all domestic firms
were so lucky. Military-based Vojenský Opravárenský Pod-
nik 081 Prˇeloucˇ (production and repairs of trucks and special
heavy machinery) ended operations in 1994 and was liqui-
dated. Another big firm, Tatra, which during socialism also
produced popular luxury cars, closed such production as a
result of foreign competition. Since 1998 Tatra has focused
only on truck production, which also suffered from a major
decline—almost 90% in 1994—and several plants went into
bankruptcy. Similarly, Avia Karoseria Brno (production of
parts and accessories for commercial vehicles and trucks),
struggled for survival in 1997–1998, but it found its market
niche and started to grow.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the theoretical model. Section III discusses the technology
spillovers. Sections IV and V describe data and variable mea-
surement. Section VI describes the empirical methodology.
The remaining sections discuss my findings and conclude.
II. Theoretical Model
Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that though technology
spillovers may exist, MNCs can draw demand from less effi-
cient domestic firms and force them to cut production. They
6 http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/Cz_AutoParts_mkt.htm.
7 “Detroit East” (2005).
8 See Pavlínek (2003) and http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/Cz_
AutoParts_mkt.htm. As part of the training, Škoda held workshops to
educate domestic firms about quality standards and how to achieve them.
864 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
refer to this competitive or crowding-out effect as market
stealing. However, this effect may also induce firm exit, so I
consider both outcomes as evidence of crowding out. More-
over, this effect can be just a one-time phenomenon, realized
at the time of foreign entry, or it can arise over time as MNCs
expand their production. I refer to the first one as static and
to the latter as dynamic crowding-out effect. Analyzing how
crowding out works helps us understand whether the adjust-
ment to FDI inflows is a shock therapy or a gradual process.
If crowding out is a dynamic effect, given the demand, for-
eign sales growth should reduce the sales of domestic firms
over time and thus reduce their growth rates and threaten their
survival. If it is a static effect, then only foreign entry should
have a negative effect on domestic firm growth rates and sur-
vival. Afterward, the demand of both domestic and foreign
firms should be driven only by common shifts in aggregate
demand.
A. Dominant Firm-Competitive Fringe Structure and Theory
on MNCs
I assume that a domestic market with foreign firms resem-
bles a dominant firm–competitive fringe (DF/CF) industry
structure. For simplicity, foreign firms as a group are repre-
sented by a single dominant firm (DF), and domestic firms
form the competitive fringe (CF, henceforth, “fringe”).9 In the
standard DF/CF model, a dominant firm has a higher market
share than a single firm on the fringe (though collectively,
fringe firms may have a substantial market share), thanks to
better management or technology, early entry into the mar-
ket and learning by doing, economies of scale, or a favorable
public policy, such as subsidies. Thanks to these cost advan-
tages, a dominant firm behaves like a market leader and sets
the market prices that fringe firms take as given.10
The assumptions about dominant firm are quite consis-
tent with the characteristics of MNCs found in the empirical
studies11 and the ownership advantages emphasized by Dun-
ning’s (1988) theory on MNCs.12 Hymer (1960) also argued
that scale economies, knowledge, and credit advantages of
MNCs help them to increase their market power. One can
expect that in transitional countries such as the Czech Repub-
lic, where domestic firms operated for years without market
competition, prices and quantities were centrally determined
and firms often received subsidies without any incentives to
9 However, the main implications of the model would hold even under
other forms of imperfect competition or if MNCs behaved competitively.
The key point is that more efficient foreign firms reduce the market price
and thus decrease output (or induce exit) of domestic firms. So even without
a dominant firm assumption, the main result in equation (6) would hold.
10 See Carlton and Perloff (2000) for more details on the DF/CF model.
11 MNCs usually have high levels of R&D, intangible assets, patents, and
new or technically complex products (Markusen, 1995). Morck and Yeung
(1991) also find that firm age is highly correlated with multinationality.
12 According to Dunning’s ownership advantages, MNCs must possess
product, process, or technology that local firms cannot gain access to, due to
protection by a patent or trademark, for example, and that confers sufficient
market power or a cost advantage that outweighs the uncertainty from doing
business abroad.
Figure 1.— Dominant Firm and Competitive Fringe
improve their efficiency, MNCs with advanced technologies,
long-term experience in competitive markets, and generous
FDI incentives13 can easily gain market dominance.14
B. Static Crowding Out
Figure 1 shows the static crowding-out effect due to foreign
entry. Figure 1a shows the market demand D(p), total fringe
supply S(p), and the shut-down price p of the fringe firms.
Figure 1b introduces the dominant firm, where the residual
demand of the dominant firm is a horizontal distance between
D(p) and S(p). The dominant firm behaves as a market leader
and chooses output QDF s.t. MR = MCDF , which sets the
market price and thus the quantity that the fringe can sell on
the market, QCF . As a result, some domestic firms produce
less and some exit. The extent of crowding out depends on
the difference between the marginal costs of the dominant
and the fringe firms. If the marginal cost of a dominant firm
is very low, say MCDF2 , the new market price is below p,
and all domestic firms exit. If the dominant firm’s marginal
cost is higher, say MCDF1 , the equilibrium price is p∗, and the
domestic firms with shut-down prices below p∗ survive but
produce less.
C. Dynamic Crowding-Out Effect
To analyze the impact of foreign presence on domestic
firms over time, I incorporate the DF/CF industry structure
into a model of firm and industry dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982;
Sun, 2002). I assume that domestic firms (i.e., fringe) follow
Jovanovic’s setup: they are heterogeneous firms that operate
in a competitive industry with incomplete information about
their cost efficiency and learn about it only while operating
13 In the Czech Republic the incentives for foreign investors include up to
ten years’ tax holidays, duty-free imports, and financial support by govern-
ment for training and job creation (European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 2003).
14 For example, in the Czech chemical industry, the International Center
for Economic Growth report (2003) notes, “concentration is being con-
trolled by a closed number of great MNCs.…The need of capital can arise
some problems for small and medium sized enterprises due to their less
economic power, insufficient legal, economic, technical and management
capacities.”
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in the industry. As a result, efficient firms grow and survive,
while inefficient firms decline and exit. The exit-generating
mechanism is missing in productivity-based studies of FDI
spillovers.15 Adding Sun’s technology shocks allows us to
incorporate technology spillovers. The model is solved back-
ward. First, given the prices, the fringe firms choose output
and decide whether to stay or exit. Second, given the total
fringe supply, the dominant firm chooses the equilibrium
prices that (for simplicity) are perfectly forecastable.
Domestic firms–competitive fringe. Many domestic firms
are on the competitive fringe, each too small to affect price.
Each period a firm chooses output qt to maximize its expected
profit
πet = maxqt
[
ptqt − C(qt)Ttxet
]
, (1)
where p ≡ {pt}∞0 , is a price sequence, C(qt)Ttx∗t are firm total
costs, and C(qt) is a convex function that satisfies C(0) = 0,
C′(0) = 0, limq→∞C′(q) → ∞, and C′qC′′ = k > 0. xt is
the inverse of firm production efficiency, where xt = f (δt),
δt = θ+εt , and xet is an expectation of xt conditional on infor-
mation at time t. The function f is positive, strictly increasing,
and continuous with limδt→−∞A1 > 0 and limδt→∞A2 ≤ ∞.
Parameter θ is the firm’s true cost efficiency (or firm type)
normally distributed with mean θ¯ and variance σ2θ . A firm
does not know its θ but learns about it while operating in the
industry by Bayesian updating through productivity shocks,
εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), independent across firms and time.16 A firm
learns its productivity shock at the end of a period from real-
ized profits and updates its expectation for the next period,
xet+1.17 Like Sun (2002), I assume that besides productivity
shocks, a firm also receives technology shocks, ut ∼ N(u¯, σ2u)
independent and identically distributed that cumulate over
time, so Tt = ∏tj=t−n(1 − uj) represents a firm’s technology
level and reflects all the shocks a firm received up to time t (n
represents firm age). ut > 0 represents a plausible (marginal
costs decreasing) shock, bounded from above by 1 to prevent
negative costs, and u¯ is the technological trend. I assume that
on entry, a firm does not have any technology improvements
yet, so T0 = 1. ut can represent any shock that has a persis-
tent effect on firm costs: innovation, management changes, or
15 Blomström et al. (2000) also argue that competition between MNCs
and domestic firms should be analyzed from the perspective of industry
dynamics, not total factor productivity.
16 Upon entry, all entrants have the same prior beliefs about their efficiency,
x0 = E0(f (θ + εt)). Each entrant considers itself to be a random draw from
N(θ¯, σ2θ). This prior distribution is updated as a firm gets productivity shocks
and infers δt . At any time t, firm expectations are formed as xet = E(x |
δ¯n, n) =
∫ f (δ)dP(δ | δ¯n, n), where P(δ | δ¯n, n) is the normal posterior
distribution of δ conditional on the information at time t, n is firm age and
δ¯n = ∑ni=1 δi/n (see Jovanovic, 1982).
17 Realized profit at the end of period t is πt = ptqt − C(qt)Ttxt . Since
a firm observes Tt at the beginning of time t, it can derive xt and infer
δt . (However, it cannot separate θ from εt). The expectations for the next
period, xet+1, are formed as described in note 16. Comparison of realized
and expected profit, πt − πet = −C(qt)Tt(xt − xet ), implies that if πt > πet ,
then xet+1 < xet and more profitable firms have a higher growth rate between
t + 1 and t.
firm-specific adjustments to a macroeconomic shock. Since
FDI inflows represent a sort of macroeconomic shock for the
domestic firms and the technology spillovers are basically a
firm’s specific adjustments to FDI that persistently affect firm
costs, I use ut to represent technology spillovers.
A firm chooses qt before it observes xt but after it observes
ut . The optimal output, q∗t = q(pt , Tt , xet ), solves the FOC:
pt = C′(q∗t )Ttxet and the firm’s discrete growth rate is given
by
q∗t+1 − q∗t
q∗t
= k
(
pt+1 − pt
pt
− x
e
t+1 − xet
xet
+ ut+1
)
. (2)
So the firm’s growth rate increases with prices (I explain
below how prices are affected by the dominant firm) and
positive technology shock, but decreases with its expected
inefficiency. The firm’s updating process implies that both
firm age and size should reduce firm growth rate. All else
equal, older firms have smaller revisions in their expecta-
tions and thus smaller growth rates. For firms old enough, xet
converges to a constant, as they have already learned their
true efficiency. Regarding firm size, for each type θ, there is
an optimal size. So if we take two firms of the same type but
different sizes, a larger firm should be closer to its optimal
size and thus grow more slowly than a smaller firm.
Every period, a firm also decides whether to stay or exit.
(The exit decision follows the Jovanovic setup, details can be
provided on request.) There is a critical value of expected effi-
ciency, xt , that gives a critical output, qt(pt , Tt , xt) at which the
firm exits. If a firm decides to exit at the beginning of period
t + 1, then q∗t+1 must be smaller than qt+1. This implicitly
determines the exit growth rate, g˜t+1 = ( qt+1−q
∗
t
q∗t
). So if the
firm’s optimal growth rate would be less than g˜t+1, a firm
exits, q∗t+1 = 0, and the observed growth rate is −1. So the
same variables that affect firm growth should also affect firm
exit. Firm exit should decrease with prices (with a convex cost
function, a firm can produce more and grow at higher prices),
positive technology shock, and expectations of higher effi-
ciency, so larger and older firms should have lower exit rates.
Dominant firm behavior and equilibrium. As in Jovanovic
(1982), I assume that every period, there is a deterministic
downward-sloping market demand, Qmt (pt), so all the demand
changes are foreseen and prices are perfectly forecastable.
In equilibrium, the residual demand of the dominant firm,
QDFt (p), can be written as the total market demand, Qmt (pt),
minus the total supply of competitive fringe, QCFt (p):
QDFt (p) = Qmt (pt) − QCFt (p). (3)
Although fringe firms face individual uncertainty, there is
no aggregate uncertainty, so QCFt (p) is deterministic in each
period.18 Given QCFt (p), the equilibrium price sequence,
18 Since ut in this model is i.i.d., it can be integrated out, so the derivation
of the total supply of competitive fringe follows market supply derivation
in Jovanovic (1982).
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p = {pt}∞t=0, must maximize the dominant firm’s net present
value of profits:
NPV(p) = max
{pt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
δt
{
pt
[Qmt (pt) − QCFt ({pt}∞t=0)]
(4)− TC(Qmt (pt) − QCFt ({pt}∞t=0))},
where TC(Qmt (pt) − QCFt ({pt}∞t=0)) ≡ TC(QDFt ) = c(QDFt )f (θDF) represents the total cost of the dominant firm, c(.) is
a convex cost function, f is the same function as in case of
fringe firms, and δ is the discount factor. I assume that the
dominant firm knows its true efficiency, θDF , so f (θDF) is
deterministic. This follows the earlier discussion that while
domestic firms operate in the competitive environment only
after the transition has started, MNCs have already operated
in the competitive markets for a long time and could learn
their true efficiency. I also assume that at each output level
c′(q) < C′(q) and f (θDF) < x0, since the dominant firm has
better technology (recall that C(q) and x0 are the cost func-
tion and the prior expectation of the fringe firms). Without
uncertainty about production efficiency and perfectly fore-
castable prices, the optimization problem of the dominant
firm simplifies into time-separable one-period optimization
problems, so each period a price pt solves
∂NPV
∂pt
= pt
(
∂Qmt
∂pt
− ∂Q
CF
t (p)
∂pt
)
+ Qmt (pt) − QCFt (p)
− ∂TC
∂QDFt
(
∂Qmt
∂pt
− ∂Q
CF
t (p)
∂pt
)
= 0. (5)
This implies
(
pt − ∂TC∂QDFt
)( ∂Qmt
∂pt
− ∂QCFt (p)
∂pt
) = −QDFt (pt). Total
differentiation of condition (3) yields ( ∂Qmt
∂pt
− ∂QCFt (p)
∂pt
) =
dQDFt (pt)
dpt < 0. Substitution into the last result and expanding
by pt gives
dpt
pt
= −(pt − TC
′
)
pt
dQDFt
QDFt
, (6)
where TC′ = ∂TC
∂QDFt
> 0. Equation (6) is a standard price cost
margin or Lerner index: p−MCp = − 1elasticity of residual demand of DF .
Rewriting it in discrete time gives pt+1−ptpt = −mt
(QDFt+1−QDFt )
QDFt
,
where mt is the dominant firm price markup. Substitution into
equation (2) gives the domestic firm growth rate as
q∗t+1−q∗t
q∗t
= −kmt
(QDFt+1 − QDFt )
QDFt
− k(aget , sizet)
+ kut+1 + industry × trend. (7)
So given the markup, the larger the growth rate is in the output
of dominant firm, the lower the prices and thus the smaller
growth rates of domestic firms. Also, the industry-trend cross
product is added to account for changes in demand, Qmt (pt),
over time. Due to the convex costs function of domestic firms,
higher foreign growth rates should also increase domestic
firm exit. Empirically, the growth rate in the output of the
dominant firm captures a dynamic crowding-out effect, and
the term −kmt represents the output elasticity of domestic
firm, q∗t , with respect to the foreign output, QDFt .
III. Technology Spillovers and Technology Shock ut+1
While the competitive/crowding-out effect enters the
model by foreign output changes, the technology spillovers
enter by technology shock ut+1 in the costs of domestic firm.
Since spillovers or externalities are by definition unintended,
ut+1 is not a choice variable of the dominant or domestic
firm.19 So I proxy ut+1 as a function of firm and industry char-
acteristics discussed in the technology transfer and the FDI
spillovers literature (the next section explains the variable
measurement).
Technology can be transferred from foreign to domestic
firms through different channels, such as business contracts,
training domestic workers, employing workers who used to
work for an MNC, or a demonstration effect as domestic firms
observe and learn from the successes and failures of MNCs.20
Regardless of the channel, though, the larger the foreign
presence is, the more opportunities there are for spillovers
(Keller, 2004). Wang and Blomström (1992) also argue that
spillovers are proportional to the extent of foreign presence
in the industry. I proxy intraindustry technology spillovers by
foreign employment share (FORempl.sh), where the higher
share should bring larger technology shocks. Sinani and
Meyer (2004) use different measures of foreign presence—
employment share, market share, and foreign equity share
in the industry—and find the strongest impact from foreign
employment share. Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007)
point to the two advantages of this measure: it shows how
prevalent MNCs are relative to the overall size of the indus-
try, and it reflects the interpersonal contact emphasized by
the spillover theories (Findlay, 1978). Intuitively, the more
people who work in MNCs, the more people who can demon-
strate or discuss what MNCs do and how, train other domestic
workers, start own business, or come to work for a domestic
firm. Thus, my measure of technology spillovers captures all
of these and other channels that involve some interpersonal
contact between a domestic firm and MNC employees. Based
on Czech enterprise surveys, Deardorff and Djankov (2000)
document the technology transfer by subcontracting. Javor-
cik and Spatareanu (2004) also note that most Czech firms
learn from MNCs through employee training (often free of
charge) or getting help with such business practices as qual-
ity control, organization of production lines, or inventory.21
The case of the Czech auto industry is direct evidence of this.
In addition, I also consider intrafirm technology spillovers
19 The technology spillovers enter the optimization problem of dominant
firm only indirectly through total fringe supply.
20 See Blomström et al. (2000, chap. 8) for a discussion.
21 Unfortunately I have no data to separate these individual channels.
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as domestic firms that have some foreign shareholders
(FORdirect) can gain easier access to foreign technology or
crucial resources by direct ownership ties (Aitken & Harrison,
1999; Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Meyer, 2004).
Several studies (including Audretsch, 1991) have shown
that firm innovation increases growth and survival. It also
determines a firm’s absorptive capacity—its ability to recog-
nize valuable knowledge, integrate it, and use it productively
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The FDI literature suggests that
in order to benefit from technology spillovers, local firms
need a certain level of technological (in-house) expertise. So
to control for firm absorptive capacity, I use firm’s intangi-
ble asset ratio (intang). Firms with a higher proportion of
intangibles should be able to adopt or imitate new technolo-
gies more easily and benefit thus from a larger technology
shock ut+1. The literature also suggests that the extent of
technology spillovers may depend on the technology gap
(henceforth, gap)—the difference in the technological capa-
bilities between domestic and foreign firms.22 The technology
transfer literature argues that a larger gap raises the trans-
fer costs and reduces the chances the transfer will happen.
However, in Findlay’s (1978) model, a larger technology gap
increases the room for spillovers. So I include the technol-
ogy gap and its interaction with foreign employment share
into the ut+1 function to allow the possibility that the tech-
nology gap stimulates or inhibits intraindustry technology
spillovers.
Since in my model ut+1 is firm specific, I allow in the
estimations firm effects μi. Also, given it is observed only
at the beginning of t + 1, I measure all the above variables
at time t. Assuming linear functional form, the technological
shock of a domestic firm i in industry j can then be written as:
uijt+1 = α1FORempl.shjt + α2FORdirectijt
+ α3intangijt + α4gapijt (8)
+ α5FORempl.sh × gapijt + μi.
IV. Data Description
I use 1994–2001 firm-level panel data for the Czech
Republic from the Amadeus database, which covers firms in
western, central, and eastern Europe and Russia. It includes
firm registration (firm ID, date of incorporation, city, region,
and other firm characteristics), balance sheets, profit and loss
accounts, various industry classifications, and firm owner-
ship information. The Czech data are based on firm accounts
filed with the tax office or business register. Since all regis-
tered firms have to file, firms of all sizes are included, and
there is also a large number of entrepreneurs. So the data-
base gives a good representation of the economy.23 Also, to
22 For example, Findlay (1978), Sjöholm (1999), and Haddad and Harrison
(1993).
23 Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2005) discuss data collection by
Amadeus and conclude that country-wise, the database represents the entire
economies quite well. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) also point to its
large coverage compared to other data sources.
maximize firm coverage in my sample (Amadeus dropped
some small firms later on), I combine data across several
Amadeus versions obtained at different dates: a DVD version
for 1993–1998 and online downloads in March 2002 and Jan-
uary and February 2003.24 This also helped to increase data
on firm ownership (see note 26).
In my analyses, I use three-digit primary USSIC industry
codes. The Czech Republic is a small country (popula-
tion around 10 million), so there are very few firms with
higher-digit codes. My initial sample contained 11,545 firms.
Excluding agriculture, government, legal, education, reli-
gion, health services, and other nonprofit entities, mostly
government owned, left 10,335 firms. Dropping data miscod-
ings left 10,157 firms. Balance sheet cleaning, missing data
filing, and outlier exclusions gave a sample of 9,986 firms
(details provided on request). Among these, 5,235 firms are
classified as domestic, 1,398 as foreign and 3,353 as nonclas-
sified. Comparing classified and nonclassified firms showed
that nonclassified firms operate at zero profit margin and are
significantly smaller in market share, total assets, sales, and
other measures of size, so I consider them to be small Czech
start-ups and thus domestic firms.
The model assumes that domestic firms behave competi-
tively, so I restrict my analyses to 141 competitive industries
(at least ten domestic firms per industry before data cleaning).
Among these, 11 industries are without foreign presence,
so including them makes the analyses more representative
for the entire economy. Tables 9 and 10 list all the indus-
tries divided into high- and low-export oriented. The final
samples I use to estimate the growth and exit equation
contain 5,705 (20,462 observations) and 6,291 (24,733 obser-
vations) domestic firms, respectively, and 1,304 foreign firms
(unbalanced).25
I classify a firm as foreign if its ultimate owner (a firm at
the top of the ownership chain) is not Czech (see Appendix).
I prefer ultimate ownership to the sum (or total) of foreign
direct ownerships used in previous studies, since the sum does
not reflect who has ultimate control or a final word on a firm
(see also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).26
Table 2 compares the performance of domestic and foreign
firms and confirms that the key assumptions of the DF/CF
24 I exclude 1993 from my analyses because of a large proportion of miss-
ing data. In this year, the Czechoslovak Republic split into the Czech and
Slovak Republics, so there is also a high chance of data miscoding.
25 The exit sample is larger because some domestic firms have missing
sales in some years and thus missing growth rates. Re-estimating the exit
equation with a smaller growth sample did not change the results, so data
should be randomly missing.
26 However, Amadeus does not provide time series on firm ownership
for data before 2003; only ownership per the firm’s last balance sheet is
available. Yet comparisons across my different data versions show that
ultimate owners do not change very much over time. So although many
firms have the ultimate owner missing in each data version, having multiple
data versions allowed me to increase firm ownership data by combining the
information across time. As a result, the status of foreign versus domestic
firm does not vary in my sample.
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Table 2.—Performance Comparison: Domestic versus Foreign Firms, 141 Industries, 1994–2001.
Domestic Firms, Difference in Means:
Variable Means Foreign to Domestic Domestic Observations Foreign Observations
Growth rate 0.087∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 21,007 4,425
Market share (three-digit USSIC) 0.027∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 26,954 5,606
Market share (two-digit USSIC) 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 26,954 5,606
Employment 224∗∗ 142∗∗ 26,137 5,340
Operating revenue (in 000s $) 10773∗∗ 14366∗∗ 26,917 5,581
K/L (fixed assets/employment) 108.154∗∗ 29.634∗∗ 25,934 5,282
Intangible assets (in 000s $) 85.951∗∗ 197.761∗∗ 27,668 5,747
Total assets (in 000s $) 12482∗∗ 14364∗∗ 27,750 5,754
Intangible asset ratio 0.008∗∗ −0.0001 27,668 5,747
Sales (in 100 mil. $) 0.100∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 26,954 5,606
Value added 3822∗∗ 13008∗∗ 25,748 5,392
Return on assets (in %) 1.568∗∗ 1.029∗∗ 27,251 5,650
Liquidity ratio 1.941∗∗ −0.005 27,415 5,672
Solvency ratio 0.393∗∗ −0.024∗∗ 27,750 5,754
Cash flow ratio (cashflow/total assets) 0.051∗∗ 0.020∗ 26,953 5,617
Profit margin (in %) 0.076 0.414∗∗ 26,154 5,430
**Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Domestic firms include both classified firms (known ultimate owner) and nonclassified firms (firms with unknown ultimate owner treated as domestic). A comparison between
foreign and classified domestic firms gave the same results. The comparisons do not change when eleven industries without foreign presence are excluded. The following variables are defined as follows: value added =
taxation + profit (loss) per year + costs of employees + depreciation + interest paid; liquidity ratio = (current assets − stocks)/current liabilities; return on assets = profit (loss) before taxation/total assets;
solvency ratio = shareholders’ funds (capital + other shareholders’ funds and retained profit)/total assets; profit margin = [(operating revenues − costs of good sold − other expenditures) + (financial revenues −
financial expenditures)]/operating revenues.
model hold in my data: on average, foreign firms have signif-
icantly larger market shares; higher value-added, growth rates
and K/L ratios; more intangible assets; and better financial
performance in terms of return on assets and cash flow than
domestic firms do. Moreover, while domestic firms operate
on zero profit margin, foreign firms show positive profits.
V. Variable Definitions and Empirical Specifications
Substituting equation (8) into equation (7) and including
other controls that I explain below gives the empirical equa-
tion for the domestic firm growth rate (i indexes a domestic
firm, j an industry, and t year). The same variables also enter
domestic firm exit and survival analyses:
Growthijt+1 = β0 + β1FORgrowthjt+1 + β2FORentryjt
+ β3ageTijt + β4salesijt + β5ageT 2ijt
+ β6sales2ijt + β7ageT × salesijt
+ β8FORempl.shjt + β9FORdirectijt
+ β10intangijt + β11gapijt
+ β12FORempl.sh × gapijt + β13solvencyijt
+ β14pre-1989i +
∑
t
dt +
∑
j
dj +
∑
r
dr
+
∑
j
dj ∗ trend + (μi + eijt+1).
Growthijt+1: Domestic firm sales growth rate, measured
as (
salest+1−salest
salest ). If a firm exits between t + 1 and t,
the growth rate is set equal to −1.
FORgrowthjt+1: Foreign sales growth rate,∑F
k saleskjt+1−
∑F
k saleskjt∑F
k saleskjt
, where k = 1, 2, . . . , F denotes
foreign firms in the industry j.27 Measuring the
dynamic crowding-out effect, it should negatively
affect both domestic firm growth rates and survival.
FORentryjt: Dummy = 1 in the first year I observe a
foreign firm in the industry j, to measure static crowd-
ing out. It should negatively affect both domestic
firm growth and survival. Though it is not an exact
measure of foreign entry—in most industries, for-
eign firms are already “in” around the beginning of
my sample—it is very close to the true entry year.
As table 11 shows, most MNCs entered during the
privatization process between 1991 and 1995.28
ageTijt: Firm age calculated from the start of the tran-
sition in 1989. If a firm was founded later, I use
a true age. Before 1989, there was no competition,
so firms did not face the risk of market exit. So the
pretransitional experience should not affect a firm’s
learning process about its efficiency, incorporated in
the model.
salesijt: Sales revenues to measure firm size. Both firm
age and size should have a negative impact on firm
growth but a positive impact on survival. I also include
the cross-effect ageT × salesijt and the squared terms
of firm size and age to allow nonlinear effects.29
FORempl.shjt: Foreign employment share in the indus-
try j,
∑F
k employmentkjt∑All firms
h employmenthjt
.
27 All foreign-level variables are computed before data cleaning to obtain
a precise representation of the industry. Also, when foreign entry occurs
during my sample period, the growth rate in the entry year would be infinite,
so in that year, I set FORgrowth = 2, as per the alternative formula (yt+1 −
yt)/(yt+1 + yt)/2.
28 There were two privatization waves in the Czech Republic: 1991–1992
(small scale) and 1991–early 1995 (large scale). By 1995, the major privati-
zation process was completed, and stable ownership shares were determined
(Kocˇenda & Svejnar, 2003).
29 The nonlinear terms also control for possible heteroskedasticity of
growth rates due to firm age and size.
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FORdirectijt: Firm percentage of foreign direct owner-
ship (summed across all foreign shareholders). Both
FORempl.sh. and FORdirect should have a positive
impact on growth and survival.
intangijt: Firm intangible asset ratio,
( intangible assetsijt
total assetsijt
)
.
Measuring firm absorptive capacity, it should have a
positive effect on firm growth and survival.30
gapijt: Firm technology gap, measured as: |intangijt −∑F
k intangible assetskjt∑F
k total assetskjt
|. The absolute value reflects how
much the technology of domestic firm is (dis)similar
from the technology of foreign firms (k =
1, 2, . . . , F) in industry j. As discussed, it can have
a positive or negative impact.31
FORempl.sh × gapijt: If a larger technology gap
between domestic and foreign firms makes technol-
ogy spillovers more costly, this cross-effect should
have a negative impact on firm growth and survival.
However, if a larger gap increases room for spillovers,
the impact should be positive.32
solvencyijt: Firm solvency ratio,
( shareholders fundsijt
total assetsijt
)
. The
numerator is the sum of shareholders’ capital and
other funds, including retained profits. Finance stud-
ies suggest that growth, especially of small firms,
depends on the availability of internal finance or
retained profits.33 I have no data on retained profits,
so I use a solvency ratio to control for firm internal
finance.34 It should have a positive impact on firm
growth only if firms are financially constrained. Oth-
erwise it should have no effect. I also expect a positive
effect on firm survival, since larger internal funds can
prevent firm exit.
pre-1989i: Dummy = 1 if the firm was founded before
1989. These are former state-owned enterprises, often
subsidized and facing soft budget constraints even
after 1989 (Lízal & Svejnar, 2002). I expect a posi-
tive effect on firm survival, since the subsidies were
given to prevent firm exit and unemployment, but
no or negative effect on firm growth. These firms are
often less profitable and in Jovanovic’s setup, smaller
profits lead to smaller growth rates.35
30 I scale intangible assets by total assets since larger firms also usually
have larger intangible assets.
31 In industries without foreign presence, the variables FORgrowth,
FORempl.sh, and gap are set equal to 0.
32 This cross-effect implicitly controls also for the cross-effect
FORempl.sh × intang. So there is a high correlation (0.934) between the
two cross-effects. When I included FORempl.sh×intang instead, the results
did not change.
33 See Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Lízal and Svejnar (2002) for
evidence among the Czech firms.
34 The solvency ratio is basically the inverse measure of debt-to-assets
ratio, often used to measure financial constraints. When I used an alterna-
tive measure, cash flow to assets, the results were similar, but Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) question whether this is a reliable measure of firm financial
constraints.
35 In my data, firms founded before 1989 are larger in total assets, employ-
ees, or K/L ratio, but they are less profitable than firms founded after 1989
and show on average negative growth rates.
dt , dj, and dr : Year, industry, and eight regional dum-
mies, respectively. Year dummies control for the
business cycles, inflation, aggregate demand, or insti-
tutional reforms adopted in certain years. Industry
and region dummies control for industry and region
fixed effects, including regulation, industry structure,
specific input requirements, and location. Including
these dummies helps to avoid bias due to the potential
endogeneity of FDI inflows. MNCs may target more
profitable industries or regions with larger FDI incen-
tives, or enter in a certain year, after some political
or institutional changes.
dj × trend: Industry-specific time trends to control for
time-varying industry effects (such as changes in
the industry structure) and changes in the industry
demand. Keller (2004) discusses the importance of
industry-trend effects in the FDI spillover studies to
avoid endogeneity issues.
Also, in the growth equation, I include four exit-type dum-
mies (liquidation, bankruptcy, both, and out of the register)
to control for possible differences in the growth rates due to
different types of exit.
I define domestic firm exit as the year when a firm enters a
liquidation or bankruptcy process, whichever started earlier.36
Also, I allow for a two-year prior exit window to incorporate
the reporting delays or mismatch between calendar and fiscal
years. For example, if a firm started a liquidation process in
1999 but the last reported sales are in 1997, I assume that a
firm exits in 1997. Then Exitijt = 1 in the year when a firm
exits and 0 in all prior years. Firms that survive until 2001
have Exitijt = 0. There were 554 exits across 141 industries
in my data, but due to missing covariates, 273 exits remain
in my final sample. Table 3 shows summary statistics for all
the variables.
VI. Empirical Methodology
A. Estimation of Firm Growth
For robustness, I estimate the growth equation by several
methods. First, I use fixed and random effects that control
36 I rely on the start (rather than the end) of these processes, since when a
firm enters any such process, it no longer freely operates in the market; all
firm decisions are transferred to an outside person supervised by a court. I
collected these dates from the Czech Business Register. I took as the pool of
potential exiters 3,399 firms (before data cleaning) that filed the last balance
sheet to Amadeus in 1999 or earlier and verified their status—active, in
liquidation or bankruptcy, in both processes, or out of the register—in the
Business Register. (Random checking showed that missing balance sheets
in 2000–2001 are mostly due to delayed filings.) If a firm was out of the
register, it must have already been liquidated and its record deleted from the
register. So I assign firm exit in the year in which it reports the last sales or
the last balance sheet if sales are missing. At the end, I added to the list of
exiters 100 firms that filed the last balance sheet after 1999, but their name
included the phrase v likvidaci (in liquidation). By law, a firm must add
this phrase to its name when starting the liquidation process. I have no data
on mergers or acquisitions. These, however, do not represent proper exits,
because though firms change the ownership, they continue producing.
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Table 3.—Summary Statistics: Growth and Exit Samples, 141 industries, 1994–2001.
Variable Growth Exit
Name Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Minimuma Maximuma
growth Domestic firm sales growth rate between t + 1 and t 0.094 0.589 −1 4.97
Exit 1 in a year a domestic firm exits, 0 otherwise 0.011 0.104 0 1
FORgrowth Growth rate in sales of all foreign 0.237 1.360 0.185 1.480 −1 42.14
firms in the industry between t + 1 and t
FORgrowth-cl FORgrowth × (NCL = 0), where NCL = 1 0.186 1.263 0.140 1.327 −1 42.14
if firm with unknown ultimate owner treated as domestic
FORgrowth-ncl FORgrowth × (NCL = 1) 0.051 0.522 0.045 0.663 −1 21.14/42.14
FORentry 1 in the year of first foreign entry 0.085 0.280 0.086 0.280 0 1
into the industry; 0 otherwise
FORentry-cl FORentry × (NCL = 0) 0.063 0.243 0.060 0.237 0 1
FORentry-ncl FORentry × (NCL = 1) 0.022 0.147 0.026 0.160 0 1
ageT Domestic firm age since 1989 5.471 2.383 5.667 2.485 1 12
ageT × ageT 35.609 27.963 38.289 30.013 1 144
sales Firm sales revenues 0.105 0.501 0.098 0.468 3.33e-07 22.55
sales × sales 0.262 7.303 0.228 6.676 1.11e-13 508.34
ageT × sales 0.598 3.017 0.573 2.866 2.00e-06 138.07
FORempl.sh. Foreign employment share per industry-year 0.213 0.166 0.211 0.162 0 0.98
FORdirect % of foreign direct ownership in a domestic firm 2.013 10.575 2.024 10.650 0 100
intang Firm intangible assets/total assets 0.007 0.035 0.007 0.038 0 0.96/0.99
gap Firm technology gap (see text) 0.010 0.037 0.010 0.039 0 0.94/0.98
FORempl.sh × gap 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.012 0 0.4/0.85
pre-1989 1 if a firm founded before start of transition 1989 0.056 0.229 0.053 0.223 0 1
solvency shareholder funds/total assets 0.388 0.331 0.380 0.335 −1 1
NoForeign 1 if no foreign firms present in industry-year 0.179 0.132 0.018 0.131 0 1
Indust.Growth Industry sales growth rate between t + 1 and t 0.076 0.824 −0.995 23.67
DOMentry 1 in every year when other domestic firms enter the industry 0.842 0.365 0.813 0.39 0 1
DOMentry-cl DOMentry × (NCL = 0) 0.642 0.484 0.545 0.491 0 1
DOMentry-ncl DOMentry × (NCL = 1) 0.217 0.413 0.218 0.413 0 1
DOMgrowth Growth rate in sales among other domestic firms 0.005 0.195 −0.94 1.19
in the industry between t + 1 and t
DOMgrowth-cl DOMgrowth × (NCL = 0) 0.005 0.168 −0.94 1.19
DOMgrowth-ncl DOMgrowth × (NCL = 1) 0.0001 0.098 −0.94 1.18
Observations: 20,462 24,733
Exits: 273 273
Domestic firms: 5,705 6,291
In the growth sample, there are 3,982 classified (dummy NCL = 0, 15,173 observations) and 1,723 nonclassified (NCL = 1, 5,289 observations) domestic firms, for a total of 5,705 domestic firms. Similarly in the
exit sample, there are 4,278 classified (NCL = 0, 18,114 observations) and 2,013 nonclassified (NCL = 1, 6,619 observations) domestic firms.
a If not the same in both samples, then the statistics are reported first for growth sample and (after the slash) for exit sample.
for firm unobserved heterogeneity.37 Then I estimate a Tobit
model to control for data censoring. Though linear models
provide inconsistent estimates when the dependent variable
is censored, they provide a useful benchmark for the mar-
ginal effects near the population means (Wooldridge, 2002).
A random effects model assumes that firm unobserved hetero-
geneity μi is part of the error, so the estimates are inconsistent
if μi is correlated with the regressors. In such a case, a fixed
effects estimator is appropriate. I verify such correlation by
a Hausman test.
Although exit observations (Growthijt+1 = −1) are
included in the linear models, they ignore that the dependent
variable is censored at −1. To control for censoring, I esti-
mate both pooled and random effects tobit. At the end, I also
use GEE (generalized estimating equations). While a random
effects model provides efficient estimates under the assump-
tions of homoskedasticity and equal correlation structure, the
GEE method corrects for heteroskedasticity and is robust to
37 OLS with robust standard errors corrected for firm clusters produced
results similar to the random effects model.
any misspecification in the correlation structure (Liang &
Zeger, 1986).
Controlling for firm unobserved correlated heterogene-
ity (self-selection). A Hausman test rejected the random
effects model; moreover, the sales and solvency coefficients
were very different in fixed effects and other models, pointing
to the endogeneity problem due to firm unobserved het-
erogeneity. Since tobit and survival models are nonlinear,
μi cannot be differenced out as in the fixed effects model.
Wooldridge (1995, 2002) suggests using Mundlak’s (1978)
idea of modeling firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity as
a function of a firm-level means of firm variables, Xi
′
, such
that μi = Xi ′ξ+ ai, where ai is the part of firm heterogeneity
that is uncorrelated with Xi
′
and X ′ijt . The means exclude all the
dummies, industry-trend effects, and other variables that do
not vary across firms or time (Wooldridge, 2002). However,
since foreign firms may affect firm unobserved heterogene-
ity by spillovers, I include the means of foreign employ-
ment share and foreign growth rate. Adding Xi
′
as controls,
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I estimate firm growth by random effects, GEE, and pooled
and random effects tobit.
B. Estimation of Firm Exit and Survival
Several data issues affected my estimations. In my sample,
there are 273 exits, but other observations are right censored.
The data are also left truncated, that is, there are firms that
operated for years (and thus occurred under the risk of exit)
before entering my sample. Using ageT as a measure of firm
survival, if a firm enters my sample at, say, ageT = 6, it
is only because it did not exit before I observe it, so there
is a survivorship bias. I control for both survivorship bias
and data censoring by conditioning the maximum likelihood
function on ageT at which a firm enters the sample and the
dummy whether observation is censored or not. Also, due to
the “perfect success determination” problem, I had to regroup
some year and industry dummies38 and use industry sales
growth rate between t + 1 and t instead of industry-trend
cross effects to control for industry demand.
I analyze firm exit using two approaches. First, I use contin-
uous survival analyses: a parametric log-normal model and,
for robustness, a nonparametric Cox model, because firm sur-
vival is a continuous variable (a firm can exit after two and
a half years). However, since data are grouped by years due
to balance sheet reporting, I also estimate firm exit by a dis-
crete method: probit.39 Though the theoretical model implies
decreasing hazard rates, my data showed rather nonmono-
tonic exit rates, so I use a log-normal model. As in growth,
I include firm-level means to model the firm’s unobserved
correlated heterogeneity. However, now the means exclude
ageT (and its polynomials), since it is used to construct the
outcome variables. In addition, in all estimations, I adjust
the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters.
I also tried the industry-year clusters, but the results were
similar.40
Firm survival: Log-normal model. Due to the nonmono-
tonicity of hazard rates, the log-normal model can be esti-
mated only in accelerated failure time form as ln(T) =
X ′ijtβ + ωijt . T denotes firm survival measured by ageT
(˜t indexes a particular value), X ′ijt is the vector of regres-
sors, and the error term ωijt follows a normal distribution. I
assume that ωijt = μi + eijt , where μi is firm unobserved
heterogeneity and eijt is idiosyncratic error. The density of
firm survival time f (˜t), and the probability that a firm sur-
vives up to time t˜, S(˜t), follow log-normal distribution:
38 There are no exits in the years 1995–1996, so the coefficients of these
dummies would be minus infinite. I group years 1994–1995 together and
1996–1997 together. Similarly, I group several industry dummies into bigger
categories.
39 Results from the logit model were similar and are not reported.
40 Moulton (1990) explains that when the dependent variable is at a
microlevel and the regressor is aggregated, the OLS standard errors might
be underestimated. Since similar problem may arise in nonlinear models,
I used industry-year clusters as well. However, such clustering assumes
that firm observations are uncorrelated over time, which I find much more
restrictive, so I rely on firm clusters.
f (˜t)= 1
t˜σ
√
2π exp[ −12σ2 (ln(˜t)−X ′β)] and S(˜t)=1−Φ( ln(˜t)−X
′β
σ
).
The maximum likelihood function I estimate is then
lnL =
N∑
i=1
{
di ln[f (˜ti|Xi; β)] + (1 − di) ln S(˜ti|Xi; β)
− ln S(˜tientry|Xi; β)
}
,
where di = 1 if an observation is uncensored (0 if censored)
and t˜ientry is ageT at which a firm enters my sample (to correct
for left truncation).41
Exit hazard rates: Cox model. In the Cox model, exit
hazard rate h(˜t), or the rate at which a firm exits given it sur-
vived up to time t˜, can be written in the proportional form:
h(˜t) = h0(˜t)eX ′β. Then covariates X ′ predict the shifts in the
baseline hazard h0(˜t). In tables, I report the exponentiated
coefficients, eβ, as these directly show how covariates affect
the exit hazard (Cox) or survival time (log-normal) ratio.42
Across the two models, the same variables should be sig-
nificant, but the coefficients should have the opposite signs.
Unlike the log-normal model, however, the Cox model does
not assume any distribution. Without exit ties (firms exit at
different time), the partial likelihood function has the form
l = ∏i h0 (˜ti)eX′β∑j∈R(t˜i) h0 (˜ti)eX′β =
∏
i
e
X′i β∑
j∈R(t˜i) eX
′
jβ
. The numerator is the
hazard that a firm exits at t˜i. The denominator is the sum of
hazards for all firms in the risk set R(˜ti), that is, all firms that
could exit at ageT = t˜i and already entered my sample. Since
data are grouped, many firms exit in the same year, so I use
the Effron method to handle the exit ties.43
Discrete regression analysis of hazard rates. I also esti-
mate domestic firm exit by probit model.44 Controlling for
survival time (ageT), it approximates the exit hazard rates.
Since estimates from pooled and random effects probit were
almost identical, I report only pooled probit results.
VII. Results
A. Domestic Firm Growth Rates
The results are in table 4, cols. 1 to 5. All specifications
but fixed effects include firm-level means to control for firm-
correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Now the Hausman test
does not reject the random effects model, and the estimates
are very similar across all methods. In tobit, I report the
estimated coefficients, since the marginal effects (at means)
41 I also tried the frailty versions of the log-normal model, but in most
cases, they did not converge.
42 If we increase variable Xk by 1 unit, the hazard ratio is h(t,Xk+1)h(t,Xk ) =
h0 (˜t)e(Xk +1)β
∗
h0 (˜t)eXk β
∗ = eβ∗ .
43 See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999, p. 107) for more details.
44 Since probit estimates are inconsistent under heteroskedasticity, I com-
pared the uncorrected and robust standard errors in pooled probit (see also
Evans, 1987). The errors were similar, so heteroskedasticity should not be
a problem.
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Table 4.—Domestic Firm Growth Rates and Survival: 141 industries, 1994–2001
Growth Survival
Fixed Random Cox Log-Normal Probit
Model effects effects GEE Tobit (exit rate) (survival time) (exit = 1)
FORgrowth 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.053) (0.048) (0.027)
FORentry −0.027 −0.023 −0.024 −0.022 −0.023 10.984∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.044) (0.034) (0.047) (0.047) (2.488) (0.030) (0.092)
ageT −0.252∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.047)
ageT × ageT 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
sales −0.948∗∗∗ −0.936∗∗∗ −0.955∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 19.514∗∗∗ −3.108∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.065) (0.163) (0.069) (0.069) (0.002) (20.700) (1.107)
sales × sales 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 5.622∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (3.354) (0.108) (0.208)
ageT × sales 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.110)
FORempl.sh. 0.088 0.120 0.122 0.141 0.142 0.089∗ 3.831∗∗ −1.233∗∗
(0.123) (0.116) (0.136) (0.122) (0.122) (0.118) (2.456) (0.531)
FORdirect 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.011 0.991 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
intang −0.405 −0.402 −0.414 −0.371 −0.372 372.663 0.051 2.487
(0.417) (0.393) (0.434) (0.414) (0.414) (1481) (0.129) (1.853)
gap 0.043 0.130 0.091 0.096 0.096 1.968 1.445 0.289
(0.465) (0.436) (0.474) (0.460) (0.460) (10.4) (4.142) (2.207)
FORempl.sh × 1.474 1.308 1.490 1.285 1.284 0.0001 b 23 b −8.737
gap (1.178) (1.145) (1.293) (1.224) (1.224) (0.001) (205) (8.069)
pre-1989 −0.062∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.054∗∗ 0.669 1.946∗∗∗ −0.137
(0.032) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.321) (0.368) (0.162)
solvency −0.012 −0.010 −0.015 0.010 0.010 0.080∗∗∗ 5.446∗∗∗ −1.264∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (1.645) (0.189)
NoForeign 0.055 3.045∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.540∗∗
(dummy) (0.330) (1.732) (0.145) (0.242)
Observations 20,462 20,462 20,462 20,462 20,462 24,733 24,733 24,733
Firms 5,705 5,705 5,705 5,705 5,705 6,291 6,291 6,291
Exits 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
Log-ML −16,407 −16,407 −1,856 −761 −1,198
sigma-a 0.239
sigma-e 0.513 0.544 0.538
(0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.20
Hausman test 183
p-value (0.324)
All specifications but fixed effects include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). In the Cox and log-normal models, the exponentiated coefficients and standard
errors calculated by the Delta method are reported. Standard errors in parentheses: in GEE, Cox, log-normal, and probit, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All
regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type
dummies (see text for details). The Cox model uses the Efron method for ties. For presentation purposes, the coefficients denoted by “b” are divided (multiplied) by 1000 in the log-normal (Cox) model.
were very similar. Also, since the random effects tobit and
pooled tobit estimates were almost identical and the variance
of uncorrelated heterogeneity (ai) was insignificant, I report
only the pooled tobit results.
Focusing on the variables of interest, foreign growth rate
always has a positive and significant impact on domestic firm
growth rates, rejecting the dynamic crowding-out effect. To
the contrary, the estimate 0.01 shows that increasing foreign
growth rate by 1 standard deviation (1.36) raises a domes-
tic firm growth rate on average by 1.4% (or the elasticity
of domestic firm sales with respect to foreign sales is 0.01).
This is a relevant increase given that the mean growth rate
of domestic firms is 9.4%. However, foreign entry has a neg-
ative but insignificant impact. No dynamic crowding out is
also suggested by figure 2. On average, larger foreign sales
do not seem to reduce domestic firm sales. FORempl.sh
is always positive but insignificant, as is its cross-effect,
FORempl.sh × gap. Hence, technology spillovers might be
present, but they are too small to significantly affect domestic
firm growth rates. The estimate of FORdirect turns insignif-
icant when controlling for firm unobserved heterogeneity.
This rejects the intrafirm technology spillovers and suggests
that foreign shareholders probably target firms with higher
growth potential. The results remain if I include dummy
NoForeign (column 5) for the industry years without foreign
firms and the dummy is insignificant.
B. Domestic Firm Survival and Exit
The results are in table 4, columns 6 to 8. In the Cox model,
the estimates larger (smaller) than 1 increase (decrease) the
exit hazard. The opposite holds in the log-normal model,
which shows the impact on firm survival time. Probit esti-
mates support the results in the Cox and log-normal model,
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Figure 2.— Average Domestic and Foreign Industry Sales
and the positive and declining effect of ageT on exit confirms
the nonmonotone hazard rates. So the results are robust.
The estimate of FORgrowth in the log-normal model
shows that a foreign growth rate larger by 1 standard devia-
tion (1.48) raises firm survival by 36%.45 The Cox model also
implies exit rates lower by 42%. These results, similar to the
growth analysis, reject dynamic crowding out but show evi-
dence for the static crowding-out effect. FORentry reduces
firm survival by around 80% (1–0.214) and increases exit in
the Cox and probit models. So there is a shakeout of domes-
tic firms on foreign entry, but domestic firms subsequently
benefit from a larger foreign growth. Moreover, FORempl.sh
significantly increases firm survival (or reduces exit) and pro-
vides evidence for intraindustry technology spillovers. The
log-normal model shows that a foreign employment share
larger by 1 standard deviation (0.162) raises firm survival
by 24%. But there is no evidence of intra-firm technology
spillovers; FORdirect is always insignificant.
Given these opposing FDI effects, how soon would the pos-
itive externalities offset the negative entry effect? Assessing
the long-run net impact on domestic firm survival time, when
all three effects are significant—initial FORentry (−80%),
FORgrowth between t + 1 and t (+36%), and technology
spillovers each period t (+24%)—implies that positive exter-
nalities offset the initial foreign entry shock in 2 years.
Similarly, when looking on the impact on domestic firm
growth rates, FORgrowth increases domestic firm growth
rates by 1.4% (while the other two effects are insignificant),
so again domestic firms benefit from positive spillovers as
soon as in 2 years.
C. Robustness Checks
The results also remain if I drop exit-type dummies in
the growth equation, analyze exit using a smaller growth
45 The impact is calculated as follows: exp{1.48 × ln 1.233} − 1 = 36%,
where 1.233 is the estimated coefficient and 1.48 is the standard deviation
of FORgrowth in the exit sample (see table 3).
sample or using firm true age instead of ageT (this supports
an earlier discussion that firm learning about its efficiency
from the model starts with the transition). To verify that my
results are not driven by measurement issues, I conduct the
additional unreported robustness checks, but the results still
hold: (a) split the coefficients of FORgrowth and FORentry
across classified and nonclassified domestic firms. The results
show that the positive foreign growth effect is driven by the
classified (for sure) domestic firms; (b) use shorter time peri-
ods when most foreign firms have data on sales balanced;
and (c) drop the year 2001 with the most missing sales obser-
vations and repeat analyses using FORgrowth constructed
only across foreign firms that have complete times series on
sales. Finally, I repeat the analyses across subsamples with
different levels of firm foreign direct ownership. Aitken and
Harrison (1999) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find pos-
itive FDI impact only on the joint ventures. However, I find
that domestic firms without foreign shareholders benefit most
from foreign growth and technology spillovers, but the static
crowding out remains across all firms. To further explore how
to explain the positive foreign growth effect, I test alternative
hypotheses in the next section.
VIII. How to Explain No Dynamic Crowding-Out Effect?
A. Are Foreign Firms Different, or Do They Pick Up a
General Entry or Growth Effect?
Although in all estimations I control for year, industry, and
regional dummies to avoid potential endogeneity biases due
to aggregate demand shocks or industry or regional differ-
ences, and I include three-digit industry-specific time trends
(industry growth in survival) to control for time-varying
industry changes that may affect both domestic and foreign
firms, my controls might not fully capture these effects. Or
despite significant differences in size and profits (table 2),
MNCs in my data may not actually be so different in their
production efficiency from domestic firms as assumed in the
model, so my results may just be picking up a general entry
or growth effect, common to foreign and domestic firms. To
verify that my results truly show the impact of FDI and that
foreign firms have a different impact from other domestic
firms, I include in my specification controls for the dynam-
ics in the domestic sector DOMentry − dummy = 1 if other
domestic firms (than firm i) enter the industry in year t; and
DOMgrowth−growth rate (between t+1 and t) in the domes-
tic part of the industry captured by the sales of other domestic
firms (than firm i) in the same three-digit industry.46 Due to
missing sales among several domestic firms, however, I could
46 A domestic firm is an entrant if it is one year (or less) old. Also note
that since domestic firms were “always” present in the industry, DOMen-
try measures the impact from any new inflow of domestic firms into the
industry, while FORentry measures the initial shock when foreign firms
entered the industry the first time. However, if the production efficiency of
domestic entrants improves over time, which is likely, then DOMentry is a
proper analog to FORentry dummy. Both DOMentry and DOMgrowth were
constructed before data cleaning to get the best coverage of the industry.
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Table 5.—Domestic Firm Growth and Survival: Foreign versus Other Domestic Firms.
Model Growth (Tobit) Survival (Log-Normal)
FORgrowth 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
FORentry −0.022 −0.022 −0.021 0.216∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
DOMentry −0.016 −0.015 0.753∗∗ 0.739∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.087) (0.088)
DOMgrowth 0.018 0.016 1.363 1.373
(0.033) (0.033) (0.305) (0.304)
ageT −0.274∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
ageT × ageT 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
sales −0.929∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ 18.283∗∗∗ 10.690∗∗ 10.172∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (18.859) (10.032) (9.222)
sales × sales 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.107) (0.099) (0.096)
ageT × sales 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
FORempl.sh. 0.141 0.138 0.137 3.337∗ 3.024∗ 2.706
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (2.159) (1.916) (1.722)
FORdirect 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.991 0.991 0.991
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
intang −0.395 −0.374 −0.397 0.053 0.106 0.105
(0.415) (0.414) (0.415) (0.131) (0.251) (0.245)
gap 0.128 0.094 0.125 1.125 0.420 0.355
(0.461) (0.460) (0.461) (3.131) (1.076) (0.885)
FORempl.sh. × gap 1.261 1.298 1.274 52 b 72 b 162 b
(1.225) (1.225) (1.225) (451) (633) (1406)
pre-1989 −0.053∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.053∗∗ 1.911∗∗∗ 2.023∗∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.359) (0.379) (0.370)
solvency 0.010 0.010 0.010 5.320∗∗∗ 6.620∗∗∗ 6.482∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (1.591) (2.183) (2.116)
NoForeign 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.377∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(dummy) (0.330) (0.330) (0.330) (0.135) (0.146) (0.134)
Observations 20,462 20,462 20,462 24,733 20,462 20,462
Firms 5,705 5,705 5,705 6291 5,705 5,705
Exits 273 273 273 273 273 273
Log-ML −16, 406 −16, 406 −16, 406 −758 −686 −682
sigma-e 0.538 0.538 0.538
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.12 0.12
All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and standard
errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies.
The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). For presentation purposes, the
coefficients (and standard errors) denoted by “b” are divided by 1,000.
not reliably calculate DOMgrowth for all industry years in my
exit sample. So when controlling for DOMgrowth, the sample
is the same as when estimating the growth equation.47
Table 5 shows the results from the tobit and log-normal
models when gradually adding these controls. Including any
of these variables does not change my previous findings. In
particular, the estimated impacts of foreign firms in table 5 are
basically the same as those estimated in table 4 (columns 5
and 7).48 In both tables, tobit results show FORgrowth = 0.01
being significant and FORentry insignificant. In survival,
47 Gaps in sales can create huge jumps in domestic output and thus growth
rates, especially when aggregating across a small number of firms. To avoid
this mismeasurement I took all the observations (before data cleaning) with
nonmissing firm growth rates and calculated DOMgrowth as the sum of
other domestic firm growth rates weighted by their shares in the total three-
digit domestic production at time t. When I calculated DOMgrowth within
two-digit industry, the results were the same as the ones I report.
48 The results do not change if in the survival, I exclude overall industry
growth rate as a control.
FORgrowth = 1.233 in table 4 (column 7), while the esti-
mates in table 5 are about the same: 1.228, 1.217, and 1.213,
despite the smaller sample size. Similarly, when comparing
the effect of FORentry, log-normal estimates in both tables
are around 0.2, implying a reduction in domestic firm survival
by 80%. Such similarities hold also in the unreported regres-
sions when I split the coefficients of foreign and other domes-
tic firms across classified and nonclassified domestic firms.
Moreover, the growth of other domestic firms, DOM-
growth, has an insignificant impact on both growth rate and
survival of a focal domestic firm. DOMentry shows a signif-
icant impact only on survival, but unlike foreign entry, other
domestic entrants represent a much weaker threat, reduc-
ing firm survival by about 25% according to the estimates
in table 5.49 However, even this effect goes away when I
49 The difference between FORentry and DOMentry was statistically
significant at 1%.
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divide the industries into those with high versus low FDI
stock (see below). So the impact of foreign firms is differ-
ent from other domestic firms, supporting the discussion in
section IIA.50
It might be that domestic and foreign dynamics work differ-
ently across industries with and without foreign presence and
my results are actually driven by eleven industries without
foreign firms (the industries that only domestic firms enter).
So in unreported regressions, I drop these eleven industries.
The results confirm all my previous findings and reject such
an explanation.
B. Industries with Foreign Firms: High versus Low
FDI Stock
I further divide 130 industries with foreign firms into those
with high versus low FDI stock. The first subsample includes
industries that primarily foreign firms enter, while the latter
includes industries that both domestic and foreign firms enter.
If my results reflect FDI impact rather than the impact of some
other unobserved factors, one would expect stronger effects
in industries with high FDI stock.
The Czech National Bank (2003) reports that by 2001, the
highest FDI accumulated the following eight two-digit NACE
sectors: 34: Motor Vehicles (6.3%); 26: Nonmetallic Min-
eral Products (5.3%); 23–25: Petroleum, Chemical Products
(5.5%); 40–41: Electricity, Gas and Water (6.1%); 50–52:
Trade and Repairs (15.1%); 65–67: Financial Intermedia-
tion (14.8%); 70–74: Real Estate and Business Activities
(11.4%); 60–64: Transport and Communications (10.4%).
The remaining 25.2% of FDI stock was distributed among
other industries. Using Amadeus concordance tables, I trans-
lated these eight sectors into three-digit USSICs and define
65 matching industries in my data as high-FDI stock subsam-
ples. The other 65 industries (out of 130) in my data represent
low-FDI stock subsamples. Also, to maximize sample sizes,
especially when analyzing firm survival, I drop DOMgrowth
because it was never significant in the previous analyses, and
I thus use the full exit sample of 24,733 observations.
The results in table 6 again confirm my findings of
static but no dynamic crowding-out effect, and both FOR-
growth and FORentry show stronger impacts in high- than in
low-FDI industries. FORgrowth (larger by 1 standard devi-
ation) raises domestic firm growth rates by around 1.7% in
high-FDI industries but is insignificant in low-FDI indus-
tries, and it raises firm survival by 43% in high- versus
35% in low-FDI industries. The same is true for FORentry
effect. Interestingly also, FORempl.sh shows a much higher
importance of technology spillovers on domestic firm sur-
vival in low-FDI industries. And, DOMentry shows and
insignificant impact (at the 5% level) on both growth and
survival.
50 Aghion et al. (2009) analyze the impact of entry on incumbents’ inno-
vation and productivity in the U.K. They also find a significant impact from
foreign entry, but no impact from domestic entry.
Table 6.—Industries with Foreign Firms: High versus Low FDI Stock
Growth (Tobit) Survival (Log-Normal)
Model High FDI Low FDI High FDI Low FDI
FORgrowth 0.012∗∗ 0.001 1.257∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.086) (0.069)
FORentry −0.079 0.064 0.074∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.069) (0.018) (0.047)
DOMentry −0.017 −0.017 0.715∗ 0.788
(0.024) (0.021) (0.123) (0.115)
ageT −0.290∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017)
ageT × ageT 0.016∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
sales −0.966∗∗∗ −1.435∗∗∗ 30.787∗ 12.494∗
(0.091) (0.133) (58.665) (17.394)
sales × sales 0.038∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.164) (0.180)
ageT × sales 0.023∗∗ 0.009
(0.009) (0.010)
FORempl.sh. 0.145 0.104 1.760 13.623∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.197) (1.506) (12.207)
FORdirect 0.000 0.002 0.979∗ 1.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004)
intang −0.581 −0.796 0.008 0.009
(0.909) (0.560) (0.026) (0.036)
gap 0.830 −0.150 0.735 172.697
(0.979) (0.565) (2.498) (663.442)
FORempl.sh. × 0.117 2.124 3.23e + 08∗ 0.0003
gap (1.680) (1.851) (3.55e + 09) (0.003)
pre-1989 −0.070∗∗ −0.023 1.713∗∗ 2.529∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038) (0.404) (0.769)
solvency 0.014 −0.015 5.913∗∗∗ 4.899∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.051) (2.189) (2.385)
Observations 12,715 7,406 15,520 8,805
Firms 3,635 1,970 4,023 2,156
Exits 171 95 171 95
Log-ML −10,953 −4,975 −476 −263
sigma-e 0.571 0.471
(0.004) (0.004)
Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.17
All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text
for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and
standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported.
*Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional
dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the
industry growth rate was included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details).
Overall, this section confirms the robustness of my original
specification and all the findings and provides compelling evi-
dence that the impact of foreign firms is different from other
domestic firms. In particular, although there are long-run
benefits from foreign firms—positive externalities offset the
negative shakeout effect due to initial foreign entry within two
years (see section VII)—there are no such benefits from other
domestic firms. At a macrolevel, Borensztein et al. (1998)
also find that across 69 developing countries, FDI contributes
to overall growth much more than domestic investment does.
Below I use my original empirical specification, as it also
allows me to use my full sample, and explore the alterna-
tive hypotheses that could explain positive FORgrowth and
dynamic crowding-in effect.
C. Technology Leaders versus Technology Laggards
Blomström et al. (2000), Keller (2004), and Aghion et al.
(2009) suggest that we should see the crowding-out effect
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Table 7.—Domestic Firm Growth Rates and Survival: Technology
Laggards versus Leaders
Growth (Tobit) Survival (Log-Normal)
Model Laggards Leaders Laggards Leaders
FORgrowth 0.002 0.010∗∗ 1.314∗∗ 1.208∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.148) (0.047)
FORentry −0.011 −0.016 0.174∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.056) (0.032)
ageT −0.232∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.014)
ageT × ageT 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
sales −1.456∗∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗ 5.579 45.067∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.083) (11.186) (64.981)
sales × sales 0.063∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.471 0.422∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.262) (0.164)
ageT × sales −0.003 0.014∗
(0.017) (0.008)
FORempl.sh. −0.214 0.321∗∗ 3.626 3.238∗
(0.212) (0.155) (5.101) (2.226)
FORdirect 0.002 0.0003 1.005 0.985
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010)
intang −0.058 −5.011∗∗∗ 0.175 0.265
(0.721) (1.498) (2.570) (2.451)
gap 0.008 4.776∗∗∗ 889 b 0.166
(0.691) (1.564) (8585) (1.578)
FORempl.sh. × 0.658 1.547 249 b 412 b
gap (2.683) (1.441) (9587) (3655)
pre-1989 −0.062 −0.053∗ 4.325∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗
(0.042) (0.031) (1.919) (0.292)
solvency 0.117∗∗ −0.040 16.241∗∗∗ 4.067∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.043) (9.538) (1.406)
Observations 6,374 13,747 7,631 16,694
Firms 1,717 3,891 1,873 4,308
Exits 77 189 77 189
Log-ML −4,486 −11,537 −238 −510
sigma-e 0.487 0.586
(0.004) (0.003)
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.11
All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see
text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients
and standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method
reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and
regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival
model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details).
For presentation purposes, the coefficients (and standard errors) denoted by “b” are divided by 1,000.
mostly in industries where domestic firms are technologi-
cally behind foreign firms. Similarly, studies on technology
spillovers often find positive spillovers only in high-tech
industries.51
To assess how technological differences affect my results,
I divide industries into technology leaders and laggards.
Technology leaders are industries in which the technology
difference between domestic and foreign firms (mean of gap
variable without absolute value) is greater than or equal to
zero. Technology laggards are industries with technology dif-
ference less than zero. Among 130 industries with foreign
presence in my sample, 83 are defined as technology leaders
and 47 as laggards.
Table 7 shows the results from the tobit and log-normal
models. They confirm my previous findings of no dynamic,
51 See, for example, Kokko, Tasini, and Zejan (1996), Haddad and
Harrison (1993), or Görg and Strobl (2000).
but the presence of the static crowding out effect. While
FORentry raises the exit hazard in both groups by around
80% (the same as in the overall sample), FORgrowth larger
by 1 standard deviation raises firm survival by 35% for lead-
ers and 41% for laggards. Moreover, FORgrowth increases
domestic firm growth rates by a similar magnitude as in the
aggregate sample (0.01) for technology leaders, but it has on
insignificant impact for laggards. Similarly, foreign employ-
ment share (larger by 1 standard deviation) raises firm growth
by 5% and survival by 21%, but again only for technology
leaders. These results support the arguments in the literature
that intraindustry technology spillovers are more likely to
appear in the technologically advanced industries. However,
I do not find any evidence for intrafirm technology spillovers
(FORdirect is always insignificant).
Table 8.—Domestic Firm Growth Rates and Survival: Industry
Export Orientation, 1994–2000
Growth (Tobit) Survival (Log-Normal)
Model High Export Low Export High Export Low Export
FORgrowth 0.004 0.013∗∗ 1.211∗∗ 1.140∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.102) (0.071)
FORentry 0.027 −0.039 0.427∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.065) (0.055) (0.045)
ageT −0.225∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
ageT × ageT 0.011∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
sales −1.243∗∗∗ −1.009∗∗∗ 6.284∗ 17.526∗∗
(0.137) (0.101) (7.202) (24.902)
sales × sales 0.088∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.377 0.444∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.005) (0.241) (0.129)
ageT × sales 0.032∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
FORempl.sh. −0.030 0.102 0.441 7.495∗
(0.222) (0.158) (0.328) (7.861)
FORdirect 0.002 −0.0002 1.004 0.982∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011)
intang −0.978 −0.322 6.581 0.005
(0.710) (0.585) (11.943) (0.027)
gap 0.151 0.723 0.150 0.006
(0.858) (0.618) (0.347) (0.033)
FORempl.sh × 2.736∗ −1.537 1.82e + 08∗ 9.5e + 09
gap (1.533) (1.955) (2.12e + 09) (1.57e + 11)
pre-1989 −0.062 −0.088∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗ 1.560
(0.038) (0.037) (0.620) (0.429)
solvency 0.044 0.016 3.445∗∗∗ 11.304∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.050) (1.569) (5.118)
NoForeign −0.035 0.397∗∗∗
(dummy) (0.295) (0.109)
Observations 6,546 12,113 7,036 13,198
Firms 1,781 3,686 1,928 3,984
Exits 79 158 79 158
Log-ML −4,017 −10,698 −222 −438
sigma-e 0.445 0.584
(0.004) (0.004)
Pseudo-R2 0.19 0.10
All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text
for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and
standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported.
*Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional
dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the
industry growth rate was included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). NoForeign
dummy is dropped in low-export industries, since they all have foreign presence.
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Table 9.—High-Export Industries
USSIC Industry Description USSIC Industry Description
201 meat products 328 cut stone and stone products manufacturing
202 dairy products 331 still works, blast furnaces and rolling and fishing manufacturing
203 canned, frozen, and preserved fruits; vegetables; and food
specialties manufacturing
∗332 iron and steel foundries
204 grain mill products 333 primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals
205 bakery products manufacturing 339 miscellaneous primary metal products
206 sugar and confectionary products 341 metal cans and shipping containers
208 beverages 342 cutlery, hand tools, and general hardware
209 miscellaneous food preparations and kindred products 343 heating equipments, except electric and warm air
221 broad woven fabric mills 344 fabricated structural metal products
225 knitting mills manufacturing 345 screw machine products, bolts, nuts, screws rivets, washers
228 yarn and thread mills manufacturing 346 metal forging and stamping
229 miscellaneous textile goods manufacturing ∗347 coating, engraving and allied services
232 men’s and boy’s furnishings, work clothing 349 miscellaneous fabricated metal products
239 miscellaneous fabricated textile products ∗351 engines and turbines
242 sawmills and planning mills 352 farm and garden machinery
243 millwork, veneer, plywood, and structural wood members 353 construction, mining and materials handling machinery
244 wood containers 354 metal working machinery and equipment
251 household furniture manufacturing 355 special industry machinery
∗252 office furniture manufacturing 356 general industrial machinery and equipment
265 paperboard containers and boxes manufacturing 359 miscellaneous industrial and commercial machinery equipment
267 converted paper and paperboard products 362 electrical industrial apparatus
271 newspapers publishing 363 household appliances
273 books 364 electric lighting and wiring equipment
275 commercial printing 365 household audio and video equipment
281 industrial inorganic chemical manufacturing 366 communication equipment
283 drugs 367 electronic components and accessories
284 soap, detergents and cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics 371 motor vehicles and motor vehicles manufacturing
285 paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels 372 printed circuit boards
289 miscellaneous chemical products manufacturing 374 railroad equipment manufacturing
302 rubber and plastic footwear manufacturing ∗375 motorcycles, bicycles, and parts manufacturing
308 miscellaneous plastic product manufacturing 382 laboratory apparatus and furniture manufacturing
317 handbags and other personal leather 384 surgical, medical and dental instruments and supplies
322 glass and glassware ∗391 jewelry, silverware and plated ware
325 structural clay products manufacturing 394 dolls, toys, games
326 pottery and related products manufacturing 399 miscellaneous manufacturing industries
327 concrete, gypsum, and plaster products manufacturing 753 automotive repair shops
*Denotes industries without foreign presence.
D. Export Spillovers versus Demand Creation Effect?
Alternatively, the positive foreign growth effect can repre-
sent export spillovers52 or domestic demand creation within
three-digit industries.53 MNCs can increase demand for local
inputs or initiate demand for new goods and services not
produced by the local firms before (for example, consulting
and various other business services occurred in the Czech
Republic only with the arrival of MNCs). Moreover, MNCs
may bring higher-quality or previously unavailable inputs
and thus enhance the production of local firms. Under both
hypotheses—export spillovers or demand creation—larger
foreign sales should increase the growth rates and survival
of domestic firms. As table 11 shows, more domestic firms
52 Blomström et al. (2000) discuss that MNCs may help local firms
enter the export markets by, for example, creating the transport infrastruc-
ture, disseminating information about foreign markets, or providing inputs
unavailable in the local markets and thus facilitating the links between local
firms and foreign buyers.
53 Three-digit USSICs often contain four-digit industries linked in the
production process. For example, USSIC = 371 includes 3711 (motor
vehicles and passenger car bodies manufacturing) as well as 3714 (motor
vehicle parts and accessories manufacturing). However, there are no four-
digit input-output tables available to explore detailed links.
enter than exit during my sample period.54 This is possible
only if firms see more business opportunities on domestic
or export market. However, if the positive foreign growth
effect represents export spillovers, it should be observed only
among export-intensive domestic firms. Since Amadeus does
not provide firm-level exports, I test this by dividing 141
industries into high- and low-export-oriented.
I take 1996–2000 exports at the two-digit CPA industry
classification (Classification of Products by Activity) from
the Czech Statistical Office.55 I define the 23 (out of 33) two-
digit industries with an average export share at least 1% as
high-export sectors.56 Using the cross-reference tables from
Amadeus between UKSIC (same as CPA) codes and USSIC
codes, I translated these two-digit sectors into the three-digit
USSIC codes. The 72 matching industries (out of 141) in
54 For evidence on FDI impact on domestic entry rates, see Ayyagari and
Kosová (2010).
55 Unfortunately, the Statistical Office does not report exports at USSIC
codes. The data for 1994–1995 are unavailable, since there were numerous
changes in the trade statistics and industry classifications due to EU enlarge-
ment that the Statistical Office did not incorporate into the data calculations
before 1996.
56 Among these, two sectors had an export share larger than 10%, and five
sectors had a share between 5%–10%.
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Table 10.—Low-Export Industries
USSIC Industry Description USSIC Industry Description
152 general building and residential building contractors 523 paint, glass, and wallpaper stores
161 highway and street construction 531 department stores
162 heavy construction 541 grocery stores
171 plumbing, heating, and air-conditioning 554 gasoline service stations
∗172 painting and paper hanging 571 home furniture and furnishing stores
173 electrical work 581 eating and drinking places
174 masonry, stonework, title setting, and plastering 591 drug and proprietary stores
∗175 carpentry and floor work 593 used merchandise stores
179 miscellaneous special trade contractors 594 miscellaneous shopping goods stores
361 electric transmission and distribution equipment 596 no store retailers
395 pens, pencils, and other artists’ materials 614 personal credit institutions
414 bus charter service 615 business credit institutions
421 trucking and courier services, except air 621 security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies
422 public warehousing and storage ∗628 services allied with the exchange of securities and commodities
472 arrangement of passenger transportation 651 real estate operators and lessons
481 telephone communications 653 real estate agent and managers
491 electric services 671 holding offices
493 combination electric, gas, and other utilities services ∗672 investment offices
494 water supply 679 miscellaneous investing
495 sanitary services 701 hotels and motels
501 motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts 721 laundry, cleaning, garment services
502 furniture and home furnishing wholesale dealing 729 miscellaneous personal services
503 lumber and other construction materials 731 advertising
504 professional, commercial equipment 734 services to dwellings
505 metals and minerals, except petroleum wholesale dealing 735 miscellaneous equipment rental and leasing
506 electrical goods wholesale dealing 737 computer programming, data processing, other PC services
507 hardware, plumbing, and heating equipment 738 miscellaneous business service
508 machinery equipment and supplies wholesale dealing 751 automotive rental and leasing
509 miscellaneous durable goods wholesale dealing ∗792 theatrical producers, bands orchestras, and entertainers
512 drugs, drug properties 794 commercial sports
513 apparel, piece goods, and notions wholesale dealing 799 miscellaneous amusement and creation services
514 groceries and related products wholesale dealing 871 engineering, architectural and surveying services
515 farm product raw materials 873 research, development and testing services
516 chemical and allied products 874 management and public relations services
519 miscellaneous non-durable goods
*Denotes industries without foreign presence.
my sample represent the high-export industries. The other 69
industries in my sample represent low-export industries (see
tables 9 and 10). Also, since my export data are available only
until 2000, I exclude the year 2001 from the analysis.
Table 8 shows that while foreign growth rate (larger by 1
standard deviation) raises domestic firm survival in all indus-
tries, it significantly raises growth rates by 1.8% only among
low-export firms. Since high-export firms have established
customers abroad, the local links with MNCs are not so cru-
cial for their growth as for the other domestic firms. So I
propose that the positive foreign growth effect that I find rep-
resents domestic demand creation (via customer and supplier
links among domestic and foreign firms within three-digit
industries), not export market spillovers. Similarly, the static
crowding out affects all firms, but its impact on survival is
weaker (57%) in high-export than in low-export (83%) indus-
tries. This again can be justified by the fact that high-export
firms have customers abroad, so higher competition due to
foreign entry represents a smaller threat.
IX. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign presence on the
growth and survival of domestic firms, using 1994–2001 firm-
level panel data for the Czech Republic. I separate the two
opposing effects of foreign presence—a negative crowding
out and positive technology spillovers—and analyze whether
the crowding-out effect is dynamic, that is, domestic firms cut
production over time as foreign firms grow in the domes-
tic industry, or a static effect, realized on foreign entry.
Theoretically I rely on a model that combines a dominant
Table 11.—Entry and Exit of Domestic and Foreign Firms
in the Analyses
Domestic Firms Foreign Firms
Year Entry Exit Entry Exit
Before 1990 265 NA 12 NA
1990 195 NA 27 NA
1991 1,050 NA 221 NA
1992 1,308 NA 256 NA
1993 779 NA 206 NA
1994 805 81 157 20
1995 541 0 118 0
1996 471 0 74 0
1997 382 1 46 0
1998 275 78 30 8
1999 169 77 22 5
2000 51 36 3 4
2001 0 0 0 2
Year unknown 0 0 37 0
Total firms 6,291 273 1207 39
Reported numbers include firms with with nonmissing sales.
DO FOREIGN FIRMS CROWD OUT DOMESTIC FIRMS? 879
firm-competitive fringe framework and a model on firm and
industry dynamics by Jovanovic (1982) and Sun (2002). If
crowding out is a dynamic effect, the foreign growth rate
should have a negative impact on both the growth and sur-
vival of domestic firms. If it is a static effect only foreign
entry should have a negative effect on domestic firm growth
and survival.
I estimate random and fixed effects, GEE, and tobit models
to analyze domestic firm growth rates and Cox, log-normal,
and probit models to analyze firm survival. All estimations
control for endogeneity due to firm-level unobserved het-
erogeneity. My results show evidence of both technology
spillovers and a crowding-out effect. However, crowding
out appears to be a short-term or static phenomenon: initial
foreign entry increases the exit rates of domestic firms. Sub-
sequently, however, the foreign sales growth increases both
the growth rate and the survival of domestic firms. Dividing
industries between low- and high-export oriented suggests
that this positive foreign growth effect represents domestic
demand creation rather than export spillovers. My results
indicate a shakeout of domestic firms due to foreign entry,
but afterward, domestic firms benefit from foreign presence.
This is consistent with the conclusion by Aitken and Harrison
(1999) that a negative competitive effect should be temporary,
and positive FDI spillovers should dominate in the long run.
In my data, the estimates suggest that positive externalities
due to demand creation and technology spillovers offset the
initial crowding-out effect caused by foreign entry into the
industry within two years.
These results are robust across different specifications.
Additional analyses also reject the possibility that benefits
from FDI are captured by the joint ventures or that my find-
ings are picking up general entry or a growth effect common
to foreign and domestic firms. Including controls for the
entry and growth of other domestic firms and dividing indus-
tries into those with high versus low FDI stock confirm my
findings and provide convincing evidence that the impact of
foreign firms is indeed different from that of domestic firms.
Although there are long-run benefits from foreign competi-
tion, there are no such benefits from other domestic firms.
Further analyses also show that domestic firms in the techno-
logically advanced industries are the ones that benefit from
technology spillovers. This supports arguments that domes-
tic firms must be technologically advanced in order to benefit
from technology spillovers.
From a policy perspective, my paper shows that FDI gener-
ates positive benefits for domestic firms, so countries should
remove, not install, restrictions against FDI. The results
also provide justification for transitional countries’ granting
investment incentives to MNCs.
A related issue, beyond the scope of this paper, however,
is whether the FDI impact varies with the country of ori-
gin. Using a smaller sample, where I could identify at least
the region of the ultimate owner, I find that the strongest
technology spillovers generate the MNCs from Anglo-Saxon
countries (United States, Canada and United Kingdom),
while the MNCs from western Europe drive the demand cre-
ation effect.57 Due to the lack of exact data on the origin of
MNCs, these results are suggestive, but they indicate that FDI
origin may affect the type and magnitude of FDI spillovers.
Thus, governments should be careful when and what type of
FDI incentives to offer. I leave the detailed analyses of these
issues for future work.
57 See Kosová (2004) for more details.
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APPENDIX
Determination of Firm Ultimate Ownership
Amadeus assigns an ultimate owner (UO) if a firm has at least one
shareholder with a share equal to or greater than 24.9%. Otherwise, UO is
missing or unknown. Out of 10,335 firms in my initial sample, 2,352 had
the country of UO reported, so the classification Czech versus foreign is
straightforward. An additional 1,705 firms had only the name of UO, but its
country was missing. I wrote a program that searches for the country initials,
legal forms, and so on in the name of UO that would imply that UO is not
Czech. In addition, I classify a firm as foreign when UO is missing, because
a firm has only minority shareholders, but the average of firm foreign direct
ownerships (across all firm shareholders and years) is 50% or more. If the
average is less than 50%, I classify the firm as domestic. If a firm has an UO
but it is unknown, I classify it as foreign if the average of firm foreign direct
ownership is 60% or more (I use a 60% threshold to avoid the possibility that
there might be an unreported 50% shareholder). Since these averages are
calculated across all the years I observe a firm in my data, if the Czech firm
was privatized at the end of my sample, it remains classified as domestic,
but the increase in its foreign ownership will be reflected in the variable
FORdirect.
